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On Moral Judgements and Personality Disorders
The Myth of Psychopathic Personality Revisited
RONALDBLACKBURN
Psychopathic personality has always been a conten
tious concept, but it continues to be used in clinical
practice and research. It also has its contemporary
synonyms in the categories of antisocial personality
disorder in DSM-III (American Psychiatric Associa
tion, 1980) and â€œ¿personalitydisorder with pre
dominantly asocial or sociopathic manifestationsâ€•
in ICDâ€”9(World Health Organization, 1978), and
some overlap between these and the legal category
of psychopathic disorder identified in the English
Mental Health Act 1983 is commonly assumed.
Although the literal meaning of â€˜¿psychopathic'is
nothing more specific than psychologically damaged,
the term has long since been transmogrified to mean
socially damaging, and as currently used, it implies
a specific category of people inherently committed
to antisocial behaviour as a consequence of personal
abnormalities or deficiencies.
The most frequent objection to the concept has
beenthatsuchacategoryisafiction. Vaillant(1975),
for example, regards it as a misleading stereotype,
while Karpman (1948) claimed that it is â€œ¿amyth...
a nonexistent entityâ€•. Similarly, Wulach (1983)
suggests that the notion of a specifically antisocial
personality exaggerates the difference between the
deviant and the conforming, while minimising indivi
dual variations among the antisocial. Counterclaims
that the term is clinically meaningful commonly rest
on anecdote, but Cleckley's concept of psychopathic
personality has inspired research that seems to
validate it to some extent (Cleckley, 1976; Hare,
1986). However, research fmdings have not been
sufficiently consistent to eradicate suspicions that the
term remains a speculative construct (Blackburn,
1983a).
This paper reappraises the current utility of the
concept as a diagnostic category of personality
disorder. Blashfield & Draguns (1976) have noted
that to fulfil the communicative and predictive
purposes of psychiatric classification, a category
within a diagnostic scheme should denote a homo
geneous group whose members share a set of reliably
identified characteristics. Homogeneity is clearly
central to the issue of whether psychopathic
personality is more than a mythical entity, and the
present discussion therefore examines the extent to
which current uses of the term identify a homo
geneous category.
Homogeneity and classification
Homogeneity is a relative term denoting similarity
between members of a group. Psychiatric diagnosis
now recognises polythetic classes whose members
need not display all characteristics defining a cate
gory (Spitzer et a!, 1978; American Psychiatric
Association, 1980). In these terms, a homogeneous
class is one defined by a minimal set of attributes
possessed to some extent by all its members, and not
possessed by members of other classes. A group will
be heterogeneous if some of its members lack the set
of defining attributes or possess the attributes
defining other classes.
A class concept derives its meaning within a
particular universe of discourse. For example,
democrats form a class within the universe of
political believers, while blue-eyedness is a class
within the universe of eye colour. Groups that are
homogeneous in terms of one domain will not be so
when classified in terms of another. Thus, the class
of democrats will contain individuals who are
heterogeneous in eye colour, as will the class of
autocrats. A major issue in evaluating homogeneity,
therefore, lies in specifying the universe of charac
teristics across which homogeneous groups are to be
sought. Clearly, eye colour is not an appropriate
characteristic for defining membership in a class of
political beliefs, since eye colour neither entails nor
precludes the holding of such beliefs. In this instance,
the relationship between universes is one of conjunc
tion, since a person may be assigned to classes of
eye colour and political belief. Conversely, it is
appropriate to enquire whether a person is blue-eyed
or brown-eyed, but not whether he is blue-eyed or
democratic. To yield homogeneous groups, then, a
classification system must be based on the attributes
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of a single universe. Only if there were grounds for
believing that classes from different universes coincide
(e.g. all autocrats are blue-eyed), would it be appro
priate to introduce criteria from another universe.
This issue is particularly critical in the case of a
theoretical construct such as psychopathic persona
lily, since in the early stages of classification, the
appropriate universe may not be clearly delineated.
Several competing definitions have been proposed
in the literature, and since the lists of defining
attributes vary considerably, an immediate question
is whether they are drawn from a single universe or
domain. In ICD-9 and DSMâ€”III, the relevant
categories are among several classes within the
universe of personality disorders. Their defining
attributes should therefore logically be deviant
personal dispositions. However, mcluded in the defmi
tion of antisocial personality disorder in DSM-III
are specific features, such as expulsion from school,
or irresponsible parenting, which may or may not
be a consequence of deviations of personality, but
which are not in themselves personality character
istics. They appear to belong in a different domain,
and employing such criteria in the definition of a
disorder of personality raises the same issues for the
identification of a homogeneous class as would
classifying democrats by reference to eye colour.
Several writers have drawn attention to two
traditions in the history of the concept (Anderson,
1959; Pichot, 1978; Millon, 1981). It will be argued
here that these traditions focus on different universes
of discourse, the confounding of which has resulted
in concepts of psychopathic personality that do not
defme a homogeneous class. This history is recapitu
lated here to indicate how current conceptions have
been influenced by it. First, however, the basis for
distinguishing the different conceptual universes
involved is examined in more detail.
The universes of personal and social deviance
In psychological theory, personality does not denote
an entity, but rather refers to behavioural consis
tencies that distinguish and differentiate individuals,
i.e. dispositions or traits, and to the psychological
structures and processes proposed by various theories
to account for these consistencies. Although persona
lity is reified in ICD-9 (the personality), traits are
central to the DSM-III concept of personality
disorder. They are defined as â€œ¿enduringpatterns of
perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the
environment and oneselfâ€•,and constitute personality
disorder when they are â€œ¿inflexibleand maladaptive
and cause either significant impairment in social or
occupational functioning or subjective distressâ€•.
In DSM-III, the requirement that clinicians make
diagnoses on both Axis I (clinical syndromes) and
Axis II (personality disorders) makes it explicit that
different criteria are involved in these two sets of
disorder, i.e. that the symptoms of major syndromes
differ in kind rather than degree from the traits that
define personality disorders, and that the two may
therefore coexist. This distinction was anticipated by
Foulds (1971), who argued that personal illness
(mental illness) and personal deviance (personality
disorder) belong in different universes of discourse,
and that a person may display either, neither, or
both. The former represents departures from intra
individual norms, the latter from interpersonal
norms. Previously, Foulds (1965) distinguished
personality traits from the symptoms of illness, on
the grounds that, in contrast to symptoms, traits are
universal (i.e. vary throughout the population),
enduring (i.e. relatively consistent), and non
distressing. In his later paper, he modified this
distinction to allow for deviant traits, which may be
associated with distressing states (e.g. dispositions
to experience guilt or tension) or which are prominent
in personality disorder (e.g. hostility or lack of
empathy).
Traits describe inferred tendencies, and are there
fore distinct from specific acts or occurrences.
Deserting a marital partner or committing a crime are
specific occurrences that do not in themselves permit
the inference of a tendency. However, not all
behavioural tendencies are personality traits, since
traits also describe the manner, or the â€˜¿how'of
behaving. Descriptions of antisocial or asocial
tendencies, which appear in some definitions of
psychopathic personality, do not take this form, nor
do they describe universal or enduring tendencies.
They do not, therefore, fall in the universe of
personality traits. Illegal acts or failure to honour
financial obligations, for example, do not describe
the â€˜¿how'of behaviour, and are neither traits nor
symptoms in Foulds' terms. Moreover, these are not
so much descriptions of behaviour as judgements of
its appropriateness. For example, whether the
spanking of a child is judged as â€˜¿abuse'or â€˜¿legitimate
punishment' depends on the context in which it
occurs. The identification of such tendencies is, then,
dependent on a moral frame of reference, which
identifies departures from sociocultural norms of
what constitutes acceptable conduct. They therefore
belong in a different universe of discourse, which can
be described as that of social deviance.
Given that membership of the universe of personal
deviance neither entails nor precludes membership
of the universe of social deviance, a person may
belong in either, neither, or both. Research has
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clearly established that social deviance does not
coincide with personal deviance, since socially deviant
populations are heterogeneous with respect to
personality deviation. For example, research with
serious delinquents (McManus eta!, 1984) and drug
abusers (Kosten et a!, 1982; Khantzian & Treece,
1985) has indicated heterogeneity in terms of
DSMâ€”IIIpersonality disorders. Similarly, cluster
analyses of self-reported personality deviation have
demonstrated four distinct patterns among mentally
disordered offenders (Blackburn, 1975, 1986), female
offenders (Widom, 1977), and violent male criminals
(McGurk, 1978; Henderson, 1982). Since social
deviance may be found in conjunction with several
forms of personality deviation, or with none, it is
neither necessary nor sufficient to identify a persona
lity disorder.
The contribution of personality characteristics to
antisocial behaviour is an empirical question that can
only be answered if the two are identified indepen
dently. Defining a disorder of personality in terms
of social deviance confounds the two universes, and
makes it unlikely that a class that is homogeneous
in terms of personality deviation will be identified.
However, the concept of psychopathic personality
has variously described social deviance, personal
deviance, or a mixture of the two. These differing
uses of the term will be considered to determine
whether a homogeneous category of deviant persona
lity is distinguishable.
Psychopathic personality as social deviance
The origins of recent notions of psychopathic
personality are commonly traced to Prichard's (1837)
concept of moral insanity (Maughs, 1941). Prichard
merely elaborated the proposals of 18th century
physicians, and his use of the term â€˜¿moral'went
beyond that of â€˜¿ethical'(Walker & McCabe, 1973;
Millon, 1981). Although his illustrative cases included
only a few for whom antisocial conduct was the chief
reason for inferring moral insanity, he nevertheless
launched attempts to explain socially objectionable
behaviour, in the form of an inability to conduct
oneself â€œ¿withdecency and propriety in the business
of lifeâ€•,by reference to moral â€œ¿perversionâ€•.Moral
insanity was thus a hypothetical cause of social
deviance, and much of the subsequent debate in the
19th century centred on how a diseased â€œ¿moral
facultyâ€•could explain criminal behaviour.
The adjective â€˜¿psychopathic'first appeared in
mid-19th century Germany, but Walker & McCabe
(1973) detect three differing uses of the term.
Initially, it had the etymologically precise meaning
of â€˜¿psychologicallydamaged', hence comprising all
forms of psychopathology. In 1891, however, Koch
described psychological abnormalities that did not
amount to strict insanity, as â€œ¿constitutionalpsycho
pathic inferiorityâ€•(Koch, 1891). This was an explicit
rejection of the notion of moral insanity, and an
attempt to specify a biological basis for non
psychotic disorders. The third use of the term was
its restriction to mean â€˜¿unethical',which is attributed
to Meyer's influence in the USA, and that of
Henderson in Britain. Walker & McCabe note this
use in the report of a trial in St Petersburg in
1885, but this narrow application did not become
widespread for several decades.
In Britain, attempts to introduce moral insanity
into the law resulted in the category of moral imbecile
in the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act, but psychiatrists
resorted to the term psychopath to describe chronic
offenders who were not mentally deficient, but who
were nonetheless assumed to be morally defective.
This practice was sanctioned by Henderson, who
wrote: â€œ¿Aflaw in a person's moral structure may
constitute a disease as truly as some form of physical
involvementâ€• (Henderson, 1955). This use was
eventually formalised in the category of psychopathic
disorder in the English Mental Health Act of 1959,
which was defined as â€œ¿adisorder or disability of
mind.. . which results in abnormally aggressive or
seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the
patient, and requires or is susceptible to medical
treatmentâ€•. This permits the circular inference of
a â€œ¿disorderof mindâ€• from the â€œ¿abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conductâ€• it
supposedly causes, and as Mayer-Gross et a! (1969)
observed, it effectively equates â€˜¿psychopathy'with
antisocial conduct. Walker & McCabe (1973) suggest
that the original intention was for psychopathic
disorder to be a generic label for non-psychotic
psychiatric disorders, but that the more specific
antisocial connotations had become too entrenched.
In practice, those who fall in the category tend to
have committed socially abhorrent crimes, and are
somewhat indiscriminately labelled â€˜¿psychopaths'.
The label has dissatisfied many psychiatrists, and
in the view of the Butler Committee (Home
Office/Department of Health and Social Security,
1975), â€œ¿Theclass of persons to whom the term
â€˜¿psychopathicdisorder' relates is not a single
category identifiable by any medical, biological,
or psychological criteriaâ€•.This has been confirmed
in research that shows that those in the cate
gory are heterogeneous (Blackburn, 1975, 1979).
The Committee tentatively suggested replacing the
term with the generic â€˜¿personalitydisorder', but
when the Act was revised in 1983, the label was
retained.
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The English concept of â€˜¿psychopathicdisorder',
then, is a legacy of Prichard's â€œ¿moralinsanityâ€•.
Although wickedness or moral depravity are no
longer explicit, an unspecified mental abnormality
is inferred from social deviance. The result is a
heterogeneous group of deviant personalities.
American use of the concept of psychopathic persona
lity was initially influenced by German concepts
originating with Koch, but became increasingly
narrowed with the development of psychoanalysis
and sociology (Millon, 1981). Partridge (1930) noted
that it included â€œ¿allpersonality deviations of
whatever kindâ€•,but his use of the term personality
was global and non-specific. He proposed to use the
term sociopathy to cover â€œ¿anythingdeviated or
pathological in social relationsâ€•.Essential sociopaths
were those of the broad category of psychopathic
personalities showing â€œ¿chronicmaladjustment...
in direct relation to anti-social motivationâ€•.Like the
notion of moral insanity, this assumes that objection
able behaviour implies psychological abnormality,
although no specific personality deviationisidentified.
This term has gained acceptance in the USA, and
â€˜¿sociopath'is commonly used interchangeably with
â€˜¿psychopath'.Robins (1966), defined sociopathic
personality in terms of a number of forms of social
rule violation. Her approach has influenced some
workers in Britain (Watts & Bennett, 1978), but is
seen most explicitly in the DSMâ€”IIIcriteria for
antisocial personality disorder. However, in the first
edition of DSM in 1952, â€˜¿sociopathicpersonality
disturbanceâ€•was a generic category which included
antisocial reaction, dyssocial reaction, sexual
deviation, and addictions (American Psychiatric
Association, 1952). It was dropped in 1968, when
antisocial personality became a distinct category of
personality disorder in DSM-II, while in DSM-III,
sexual deviations and addictions are among the
Axis I disorders.
Psychopathic personality as personal deviance
A generic category of psychopathic personalities was
first proposed by Kraepelin (1904). Of several similar
typologies that followed, the most influential has
been that of Schneider (1950), which first appeared
in 1923. Schneider's concept of psychopathic
personality refers to a heterogeneous group divided
into ten specific types or classes. He explicitly
excludes antisocial behaviour from the criteria of
abnormal personality, which refers to statistical
deviations from the average in terms of excesses
or deficits. Psychopathic personalities are those
abnormal personalities who cause â€˜¿suffering'to
themselves or others. While this includes some who
break the law, their antisocial behaviour is secondary
to personality deviation. Although it is often
suggested that his psychopathic personalities include
â€˜¿neurotics',he distinguished â€˜¿abnormalreactions' to
external events or inner conflicts from abnormal
dispositions. His psychopathic personalities are, in
fact, described mainly in terms of traits (or deviant
traits), although some resemble the â€˜¿character
neuroses' of psychodynamic writers.
Schneider acknowledged that his typology was
â€˜¿unsystematic',and it has received little research
attention. Nevertheless, the classes of personality
disorder in ICD-8 and ICDâ€”9and in DSMâ€”IIare
essentially his psychopathic personalities. As Pichot
(1978) notes, it is paradoxical that the term psycho
pathic personality has been reserved in English and
American psychiatry for the narrower â€˜¿antisocial'
category. While the â€˜¿sociopathic'personality disorder
of ICDâ€”9resembles Schneider's affectionless type,
the inclusion of antisocial behaviour in the criteria
violates his principle of classifying by reference to
personality deviation alone.
The Axis II personality disorders of DSMâ€”III
are also equivalent to psychopathic personalities
in Schneider's generic sense. This typology of
trait clusters was based on the proposals of Millon
(1981), whose model of personality postulates eight
distinct â€˜¿copingpatterns'. However, the fmal version
departed from this model in several ways, adding
three categories (schizotypal, borderline, and
paranoid), which Millon views as more severe
variants of his basic patterns. A major departure
lies in the criteria for antisocial personality dis
order. In Millon's scheme, the corresponding
category is the â€˜¿aggressive'pattern, characterised
by hostile affectivity, assertive self-image, inter
personal vindictiveness, hyperthymic fearlessness,
and malevolent projection. These attributes clearly
belong in the universe of personality traits, and
Millon asserts that although antisocial behaviour
may be a correlate, only a minority showing this
pattern will exhibit flagrant antisocial behaviour.
In contrast, DSM criteria for antisocial personality
are predominantly antisocial types of behaviour, the
only traits referred to being irritability and
aggressiveness, impulsivity and recklessness, none of
them being essential to the diagnosis. This is
inconsistent with the avowed aim of DSM to describe
personality disorder in terms of traits, and Millon
comments that this category is â€œ¿anaccusatory
judgement rather than a dispassionate clinical
formulationâ€•.However, Millon's aggressive pattern
does not seem to identify a homogeneous group,
since it overlaps with his histrionic and narcissistic
patterns (Millon, 1983).
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Although the DSM-III classification of personality
disorder draws on a theoretical model, it owes little
to empirical research. Taxonomic studies of persona
lity deviation have been rare, but Presly & Walton
(1973) and Tyrer & Alexander (1979) examined the
interrelationships of selected deviant traits. Both
studies found that these could be reduced to a small
number of dimensions, the first being similar across
studies. This includes such traits as impulsiveness,
egocentricity, callousness, and irritability, and is
labelled â€˜¿socialdeviance' in the former study, and
â€˜¿sociopathy'in the latter. Cluster analysis of patterns
across these dimensions yielded groups that do not
correspond closely to conventional categories of
personality disorder. However, one of four groups
identified by Tyrer & Alexander scored highly on the
sociopathy dimension, and it included those diagnosed
â€˜¿antisocial'and â€˜¿explosive'by ICDâ€”8criteria.
Subjects in this study were psychiatric out-patients
and not specifically antisocial, and the â€˜¿sociopathic'
group appears to meet the requirements of a homo
geneous class of personality deviation. However, a
similar study by Blackburn & Maybury (1985) found
evidence for two â€˜¿psychopathic'groups rather than
one.
Hybridconceptsofpsychopathicpersonality
Several concepts of psychopathic personality have
emerged that denote a specific type of deviant
personality characterised by social deviance. These
are mainly of American origin. Karpman (1948)
analysed the concept from a psychodynamic perspec
tive. He considered that the psychopaths described
by Henderson (1955) and Schneider (1950) were a
heterogeneous group having in common only a record
of antisocial behaviour. Heterogeneityinthis context,
however, is relative to psychodynamic mechanisms
and processes. He proposed that most of Schneider's
types did not merit classification as psychopathic,
since their antisocial behaviour was secondary to, or
symptomatic of, neurosis. There was, he maintained,
a small group of primary or idiopathic psychopaths,
who are â€˜¿allntisocial', and who are characterised
by a constitutional incapacity to develop a conscience.
He regarded this latter group as â€˜¿true'psychopaths,
although he proposed the term â€˜¿anethopath'.
Karpman's (1948) argument is confused. He starts
by equating psychopathic with antisocial, and his
assertion that psychopathic personality is a â€˜¿mythical
entity' is directed towards this use of the term. This
is logically correct to the extent that antisocial people
are heterogeneous in terms of psychodynamics.
However, this is not relevant to Schneider's use of the
term. Karpman proposes to substitute motivational
explanation for description, but in doing so, changes
the meaning of psychopathic to an inferred cause of
deviance, i.e. lack of conscience. His primary
psychopath is hence a psychological type, since he
or she is defined not by the occurrence of antisocial
behaviour, but by the person's dynamic structure.
For Karpman, then, psychopathic personality
becomes abnormal personality. Primary psychopaths
are â€˜¿true'psychopaths because this is the only form
of abnormal personality that he distinguishes from
neurosis or psychosis. The primary-secondary
distinction is thus the outcome of his refusal to
recognise personality disorders as a separate group.
The primary-secondary terminology has been
adopted by several researchers since Lykken (1957)
divided â€˜¿sociopaths'into these subgroups on the basis
of differences in level of trait anxiety. The distinction
has been shown to be empirically justified by
Blackburn (1975, 1986), who found that within an
antisocial population, impulsive and aggressive
people fall into non-anxious and anxious subgroups,
which were accordingly labelled primary and
secondary psychopaths. These are homogeneous
categories, and insofar as those in the primary group
are less troubled by emotional problems, they might
seem to warrant Karpman's description of â€˜¿true'
psychopaths. However, the secondary group is
distinguished by deviant traits rather than neurotic
symptoms. The two groups thus represent distinct
types of deviant personality, and hence contradict
Karpman's assertion that only one type of abnormal
personality is uniquely associated with antisocial
behaviour. The primary-secondary distinction is
therefore misleading, and the notion of a â€˜¿true'
psychopath is gratuitous. In attempting to expose a
myth, Karpman merely narrowed its focus.
Cleckley's influential analysis of psychopathic
personality is similar to that of Karpman, although
not explicitly psychodynamic. Cleckley also criticises
earlier typologies, and proposes that most categories
of personality disorder can be relegated to the
neuroses or psychoses. He considers that the DSM-I
and DSM-II descriptions of antisocial reaction or
personality correspond to his own use of the term
psychopathic personality. Like Karpman's primary
psychopath, this is said to be â€˜¿adistinct clinical
entity'. Cleckley argues that psychopathy should not
be equated with criminality, delinquency, sexual
deviation, hedonism, or alcoholism. He proposes 16
criteria, which include traits such as superficial
charm, egocentricity, insincerity, affective poverty,
and interpersonal unresponsiveness, although not all
of his criteria are personality traits. For example,
suicide rarely carried out, impersonal sex life and
â€˜¿fantasticand uninviting behaviour with drink'
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clearly describe socially objectionable behaviour.
Cleckley is nevertheless attempting to define a
personality type.
His criteria have been employed by several
researchers, notably Hare, and there is recent
evidence that a general factor runs through them.
Central to this seems to be a lack of interpersonal
warmth (Hare, 1980; Blackburn & Maybury, 1985).
However, Blackburn & Maybury found that when
assessed in the broader context of personality
deviation, offenders meeting Cleckley's criteria fell
into two distinguishable clusters. Both exhibit a lack
of warmth, but one is impulsive and aggressive, the
other socially withdrawn. Cleckley's criteria, then,
do not identify a homogeneous category. These also
correlate significantly with the DSMâ€”IIIdiagnosis
of antisocial personality disorder (Hare, 1983, 1985).
However, a direct correspondence between Cleckley's
concept of psychopathic personality and antisocial
personality disorder is unlikely, since his criteria
appear among those for other DSM-III personality
disorders, such as histrionic (superficial charm,
insincerity, egocentricity, empty suicidal gestures),
narcissistic (lack of empathy), and schizoid, paranoid,
and compulsive (lack of warmth). If Cleckley's
concept refers to a â€˜¿clinicalentity', as he claims, it
would seem to be broader than that of antisocial
personality disorder.
Although heavily weighted with criteria of social
deviance, the DSM antisocial personality-disorder
category is also a hybrid that purports to define a
personality type. Not surprisingly, a substantial
proportion of people in socially deviant populations,
such as incarcerated criminals (Hare, 1983), delin
quents (McManus et a!, 1984), or addicts (Kosten
et a!, 1982) meet the criteria for the disorder.
However, this category is itself heterogeneous, since
a majority within it also meet the criteria for other
personality disorders, such as borderline, histrionic,
or narcissistic (Kosten et a!, 1982; Khantzian &
Treece, 1985; Pfohl eta!, 1986). This is as would be
expected given that the criteria for antisocial persona
lity disorder are drawn mainly from the universe of
social deviance, and hence do not mutually exclude
other classes of personality disorder.
Hare (1980) has developed an empirically based
psychopathy checklist, which includes several of
Cleckley's criteria, but which also includes items of
social deviance, such as delinquency, promiscuous
sexual relations, and â€˜¿manyt pes of offence'. As
might be anticipated, this measure correlates signifi
cantly with diagnosis of antisocial personality (Hare,
1983, 1985). However, analysis of the checklist
indicates that factors of personal deviance (impulsive
life-style, egocentricity) are distinguishable from
factors of social deviance (inappropriate sexual and
parenting behaviour, antisocial history, and inade
quately motivated criminal acts: see Hare, 1980;
Raine, 1985). This suggests that among those catego
rised as psychopaths by the checklist, some will be
personally deviant, some will be socially deviant, and
some will be both. It therefore seems likely that the
checklist tends to identify as psychopathic an anti
social group that is heterogeneous in personality
deviation.
Category or dimension?
It has been noted that a general factor has emerged
in some studies which is defined by traits such as
egocentricity, impulsivity, hostility, and lack of
warmth, and which has been labelled as psychopathy
or sociopathy (Presly & Walton, 1973; Quay, 1978;
Tyrer & Alexander, 1979; Hare, 1980; Blackburn &
Maybury, 1985). While this may appear to validate
the concept of psychopathic personality, it is a
dimension of personality, not social deviance.
Furthermore, a dimension is not the same as a
discrete type, and extremes on one dimension may
characterise several personality types that differ
significantly on other dimensions. The traits claimed
by Cleckley and others to identify a â€˜¿distinctentity'
may therefore represent a personality dimension that
is common to more than one class of personality
disorder.
Blackburn & Maybury (1985) demonstrated that
the â€˜¿psychopathy'dimension corresponds to a
dimension of hostility that, together with an
independent dimension of dominance-submission,
forms the basic element of the interpersonal system
of personality description originating with Leary and
subsequently developed by others (Wiggins, 1982).
Several writers have proposed that this model
provides a means of describing personality deviation
that has several advantages over the current categorical
classification of personality disorders (Carson, 1970;
McLemore & Benjamin, 1979; Blackburn, 1983b;
Widiger & Frances, 1985). In this system, segments
of the circle around the hostility and dominance
dimensions define different interpersonal styles, which
have clear parallels in the categories of personality
disorder. However, as these segments are continuous
and do not have precise boundaries, the notion of
discrete classes becomes simply a convenient fiction.
Such a system more realistically portrays the conti
nuity between normal and abnormal personality, and
between different forms of personality deviation.
Figure 1 indicates how the DSM-III categories
might relate to this scheme. The continuous circle of
interpersonal traits is marked by summary labels of
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Hostile a homogeneous class uniquely associated with anti
social deviance. While some studies have isolated an
wittvia impulsive, aggressive, and relatively unemotional
personality type, other patterns of personality devia
tion are common among socially deviant populations.
The prominence of â€˜¿secondarypsychopaths' and of
borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic disorders in
Submissive these populations clearly indicates that there is no
single type of abnormal personality that is prone to
chronic rule violation. Nor, of course, are these
categories confined to the antisocial.
Compliant it must be concluded that the current concept of
psychopathic or antisocial personality remains â€˜¿a
mythical entity'. The taxonomic error of confounding
different universes of discourse has resulted in a
diagnostic category that embraces a variety of
deviant personalities. Such a category is not a
meaningful focus for theory and research, nor can
it facilitate clinical communication and prediction.
Indeed, a disorder defmed by past history of socially
deviant behaviour is permanently fixed, and cannot
provide a point of reference for clinical intervention.
Such a concept is little more than a moral judgement
masquerading as a clinical diagnosis.
Giventhe lackof demonstrablescientificor clinical
utility of the concept, it should be discarded. This is
not to arguethat sociallydeviant behaviouris unrelated
to personality characteristics, but the nature of such
a relationship is a question for theory and research.
To define a disorder of personality in terms of
socially deviant behaviour is to prejudge the issue.
Our understanding of how the attributes of the person
contribute to socially deviant or other problematic
behaviour willonly progress when we have an adequate
system for describing the universe of personality
deviation. Focus on an ill-conceived category of
psychopathic personality has merely served to distract
attention from the development of such a system.
Coercive
Dominant
Sociable
Friendly
Fio. I Hypothesised relation of DSM-III personality disorders
to the interpersonal circle
hostile, withdrawn, etc. The inner circle represents
the normal range, and the outer circle the more
extreme variations corresponding to Schneider's
excesses or deficits, and the â€˜¿inflexible'traits of
personality disorder. DSM categories are represented
as stylesreflectingdifferentcombinationsof hostility
and dominance. Primary and secondary â€˜¿psycho
paths' would be those occupying adjacent positions
around the hostile-dominant quadrant. Millon's
notion of an â€˜¿aggressive'pattern is preferred to that
of â€˜¿antisocial',since in this scheme, antisocial
personality is a redundant concept. While styles in
the hostile-dominant quadrant might be associated
with increased likelihood of conflict with others,
there is no necessary association between socially
deviant behaviour and any particular interpersonal
style.
Conclusions
In the course of its history, the concept of psycho
pathic personality has clearly varied both in specificity
and content. Schneider's generic concept embraced
several specific categories defmed by deviations of
personality, and has become the general category of
personality disorders in ICD-9 and DSM-III. Within
English-speaking psychiatry, however, psychopathic
disorder and sociopathic personality have referred to
a narrower,but stillheterogeneouscategoryidentified
predominantly by socially objectionable behaviour.
The more specificâ€˜¿antisocial'c tegoriesof lCD and
DSM, as well as the concepts of psychopathy
developed by Karpman (1948), Cleckley (1976), and
Hare (1980) represent hybrids of these traditions
in which a distinct entity is defined by combinations
of deviant personality traits and socially deviant
behaviour. None of these has been shown to identify
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